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Abstract 
 
Active worms have posed a major security threat to the Internet, and many research efforts have focused on them. 
This paper is interested in internet worm that spreads via TCP, which accounts for the majority of internet traffic. It 
presents an approach that use a hybrid solution between two detection algorithms: behavior base detection and signature 
base detection to have the features of each of them. The aim of this study is to have a good solution of detecting worm 
and stealthy worm with the feature of the speed. This proposal was designed in distributed collaborative scheme based 
on the small-world network model to effectively improve the system performance. 
   
Keywords: Worm detection, behavior base, signature base, signature generation. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
A computer worm is a self-replicating 
computer program. It uses a network to send 
copies of itself to other computer terminals on the 
network and it may do so without any user 
intervention. 
Currently, worms are serious security threat 
that may cause congestion in the network which 
leads to large queuing delays, and high packet 
loss. Since Code Red and Nimda worms were 
spread in 2001, Epidemic-style attacks have 
caused huge damages. The internet is an 
influential function in the economy and reckon 
mainstay to the life. Once the internet is broken 
down, it will cause a huge economic loss. So the 
worm handling must be automatic in order to have 
any chance of success because worms spread too 
fast [1].  
The main difference between viruses and 
worms is the method in which they reproduce and 
spread. A virus is dependent upon a host file or 
boot sector, and the transfer of files between 
machines to spread, while a worm can run 
completely independently and spreads itself 
through network connections. [2]. 
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) serve three 
essential security functions: they monitor, detect, 
and respond to unauthorized activities. There are 
two basic types of intrusion detection: host-based 
and network-based. Host based IDSs examine 
data held on individual computers that serve as 
hosts, while network-based IDSs examine data 
exchanged between computers [3]. 
False positive (FP) and false negative detection 
errors are inevitably generated in any practical 
detection system [4]. A false positive indicates a 
normal string that is incorrectly identified as an 
alarm (suspicious string). A false negative means 
missing the detection of a suspicious string by 
incorrectly labeling a worm (or suspicious string) 
as a normal one [5]. Ideally, a perfect detection 
system would generate no false positives and no 
false negatives and would only raise an alarm 
when the actual worm is detected. 
In recent years, efficient defense against 
distributed attacks has been a hot topic in network 
security community. Instead of establishing 
brand-new, dedicating systems, collaborating 
widely deployed, single-point network security 
applications for co-defense would be more 
feasible. Through collaboration, a security shield 
that covers infrastructure of multiple network 
domains could be built without significant 
modification. Besides keeping most of original 
functions, collaboration offers individual security 
applications wider views of dynamic situations 
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improves the resilience and confidence of 
participating security applications to handle 
sophisticated security problems in optimized 
strategies. Existing collaborative schemes for 
distributed defense could be classified into either 
centralized or decentralized category. 
This paper obtained a hybrid solution between 
behavior base and signature base distributed over 
a multi sensor in the network in decentralized 
collaborative scheme to get a good solution for a 
worm attack.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as 
follows:  Section2 describes related works. 
Section3 shows the proposed design scheme. 
Section4 explains the internet worm activity in the 
network. Section 5 explains how the behavior 
base algorithm builds. Section 6 illustrates the 
signature generation briefly. Section 7 discussed 
the central alarm work. Section 8 shows the 
results of this design. Section 9 concludes the 
proposed mechanism and section 10 the 
references. 
 
 
2. Related Work 
 
Most recent research on detecting worms 
concentrates on propagation modeling. Defending 
against them remains a challenge due to their 
continuous evolution. The defense against worms 
is still an open problem.  
X. Yang et al. [6] built algorithm for detecting 
the worm which has two sub algorithms, the first 
algorithm  “short term algorithm” run well to 
detect worm, but the second algorithm  “longer 
term algorithm” cannot detect some types of the 
stealthy worm. The algorithm also cannot hold 
any equations to determine specification when the 
equation runs in the algorithm to detect early 
worm if it has higher rate for value in average of 
failure connection. Yang algorithm focuses just on 
detecting which computer contain the worm. 
M.M. Rasheed et al.[7] technique is concerned 
with detecting the internet worm and stealthy 
internet worm using their behavior. It is an 
improvement of X. Yang et al algorithm. The 
average of failure connections by using Artificial 
Immune System (AIS) is the main factor that his 
technique depends on in detecting the worm. They 
showed that their algorithm can detect new types 
of worms and that intelligent Failure Connection 
Algorithm (IFCA) operation is faster than 
traditional algorithm in detecting worms.  
S. Behal et al.[8] analyzed the outbound 
traffic; i.e. extrusion traffic only instead of 
intrusion traffic. They conclude that only 
extrusion or intrusion detection is not sufficient to 
make a network secure but rather these two 
approaches complement each other to make a 
network more secure from the threats of malware. 
It is widely believed that content-signature-
based intrusion detection systems (IDSes) are 
easily evaded by polymorphic worms, which vary 
their payload on every infection attempt. In [9] 
Polygraph, a signature generation system that 
successfully produces signatures that match 
polymorphic worms is presented. Polygraph 
generates signatures that consist of multiple 
disjoint content substrings. In doing so, Polygraph 
leverages their insight that for a real-world exploit 
to function properly, multiple invariant substrings 
must often be present in all variants of a payload; 
these substrings typically correspond to protocol 
framing, return addresses, and in some cases, 
poorly obfuscated code. It contributes a definition 
of the polymorphic signature generation problem; 
propose classes of signature suited for matching 
polymorphic worm payloads; and present 
algorithms for automatic generation of signatures 
in these classes. It's evaluation of these algorithms 
on a range of polymorphic worms demonstrates 
that Polygraph produces signatures for 
polymorphic worms that exhibit low false 
negatives and false positives. 
Zero-day polymorphic worms pose a serious 
threat to the security of internet infrastructures. 
Given their rapid propagation, it is crucial to 
detect them at edge networks and automatically 
generate signatures in the early stages of 
infection. In Hamsa[10], a network-based 
automated signature generation system for 
polymorphic worms.  Evaluation based on a range 
of polymorphic worms and polymorphic engines 
demonstrates that Hamsa significantly 
outperforms Polygraph [9] in terms of efficiency, 
accuracy, and attack resilience. 
In recent years, efficient defense against 
distributed attacks has been a hot topic in network 
security community. There are two popular 
collaboration schemes. Schnackenberg et al. 
proposed a centralized coordinative scheme called 
CITRA [11] for network intrusion detection in 
2001. A central coordinator responds for 
coordinating countermeasures based on a 
complete view of the network. Janakiraman et al. 
[12] introduced a decentralized defense scheme 
for network intrusion prevention. Information is 
shared among trusted peers to guard the network 
against intrusion. The subscription-based group 
communication is conducted over a P2P 
architecture, which brings excellent scalability. Rana Dhia'a Abdu-Aljabar        Al-Khwarizmi Engineering Journal, Vol. 8, No.3, PP40 -52 (2012) 
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Taking advantages of the P2P network, 
researchers attempted to address the major 
challenges in large scale collaboration: the 
scalability and avoidance of central point of 
failure [13]. They merged multi-dimensional 
correlation for collaborative intrusion detection 
[14], and developed self-protecting and self-
healing collaborative intrusion detection 
architecture for the trace-back of fast-flux 
phishing domains [15]. 
 
 
3. The Whole Proposed System Scheme 
 
This paper used distributed collaborative 
scheme Based on the small-world network model.  
The design of small-world network model 
obtained a hybrid solution between behavior base 
and signature base by using signature generation 
to have a signature of the unknown worm detected 
by behavior base and update the database of 
signature base. 
The signature-base is distributed over a multi 
sensor (see Figure 1) in the network to get a good 
defense for a worm attack.  
 
Fig. 1.The Small World Network Model for Worms' 
Detection .   
One of the sensors has in addition to Signature 
base detection thread, a Behavior-base detection 
thread, a Signature generation thread, a 
Monitoring traffic thread and a Central alarm 
procedure. This sensor is named a  Central 
Analyzer (CA). 
This multiple small world networks model is 
like Figure 1 connected with each other through 
(CA) in decentralized scheme (see Figure 2) to 
improve the performance by efficient defense 
against distributed attacks.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The decentralized scheme is much flexible. It 
behaves similaryl to the manners of Peer-to-Peer 
(P2P) networks. This is due to the fact that most 
of decentralized schemes are developed on top of 
P2P network protocols [16]. The P2P 
collaborative architecture gives decentralized 
schemes good scalability. Theoretically, any 
network node features compatible collaboration 
protocols could participate, so that the boundary 
of covered network could be loose. Rather than 
having a collaborative server in centralized 
scheme, each participating node takes 
responsibilities for collaboration, as shown in 
Figure 2, which brings more flexibility for self-
management. Obviously, the cost for application 
is relatively low, since it does not require any 
modification in network beyond the installation of 
software.  
When the worm detected by the behavior-base 
thread it will send the source address (src.add) and 
source port (src.port) that the worm was use it, for 
both Central alarm procedure responsible for 
alarming all sensors of its network and other CAs 
(section 7), and the Signature generation thread 
(section 6). 
The signature generation thread search in the 
suspensions list generated from monitoring traffic 
thread (section 6.1) is on the record that has the 
same src.add and src.port that the behavior-base 
Fig. 2. Decentralized Collaboration. 
colopration  
CA2 
CAn 
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sends them to it. From this record it will extract 
the worms samples to generate the new worm 
signature (section 6.2), and then it will send it to 
the central alarm procedure, which responsible for 
updating all database signature base for all sensors 
of its network and other CAs and motivates the 
signature base to make immediate scan to the all 
nodes it responsible for. 
 
 
4. Worm Scan Activity 
 
Worms spread many connection requests to 
propagate itself and infect vulnerable hosts on the 
Internet. When selecting target hosts, worms use a 
kind of scanning strategies. Code Red and SQL 
Slammer used random scanning method, and 
Blaster was a sequential scan worm. In [17], Wu 
et. al. introduced a selective random scan and a 
routable scan worm. 
When a host makes a connection request via 
TCP, it sends a SYN packet to a destination 
address. A connection fails if the destination 
address does not exist or the destination port is not 
open. Specifically, if a SYN packet is sent to an 
unused IP address, an ICMP host which is 
unreachable packet is returned (see figure 3); if a 
SYN packet is sent to a used IP address with 
destination port closed, a TCP RESET packet is 
returned (See Figure 4). 
 
 
Fig. 3. Destination IP Address Does Not Exist. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Destination Port Closed. 
If a worm uses random or sequential scanning 
to prove target hosts, the packets generated by the 
worm can reach unused IP addresses. In other 
words, the number of hosts in local network, 
which are targeted by the worm, largely increases. 
In case of normal traffic, some internal hosts are 
related to a specific port number. By checking the 
number of distinct destination addresses of 
inbound traffic with the port number, we find an 
abnormal pattern caused by a worm. The Slammer 
worm, for example, caused some infected hosts to 
send up to 30,000 scans at a second [18]. 
The life of a worm, after it is released, 
typically includes the following phases: target 
finding, worm transferring, worm activation, and 
infection. During the phase of target finding and 
worm transferring, the worm is active over the 
Internet, making it possible for network-based 
intrusion detection systems to catch the worm. 
The activities in the two latter phases are limited 
to local machines and are harder to detect by 
network-based intrusion detection systems [19]. 
 
 
5. Detection Based Behavior Algorithm 
 
This paper adopted the Intelligent Failure 
Connection Algorithm (IFCA) design [7]; it is an 
improvement of improved two rotations (ITR) 
algorithm [6] to detect the worms. 
It works in first phase of worm's life which is 
target finding. In this phase the behavior of worm 
different from normal user. Comparing with worm 
activities that scan hundreds of different IP 
address per second, normal users usually connect 
to different IP address and Web sites at a slower 
rate. Particularly, normal users may have the 
favorite web sites list, and don’t produce so many 
attempts to connect to random addresses.  
Based on the fact that TCP-based worm will 
attempt TCP connections to different random 
addresses and result in a large number of 
connection failures, the traditional worm detection 
approach mainly focuses on the TCP SYN or 
ICMP host unreachable packets. In order to make 
the algorithm more accurately, a better alternative 
method is to monitor inbound ICMP host 
unreachable and TCP RESET packets. 
The IFCA only records the number of inbound 
first failed connection packets such as ICMP and 
TCP RESET packets returned from the external 
destination address to the internal forged and 
monitored source IP address. 
If normal connection is received; i.e., TCP 
SYN/ACK, “counter” will be decreased. Only the 
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IP address to different destination IP address is 
recorded. Normal network activities are 
considered to decrease the counter’s value. IFCA 
will remove the “counter” every three days. 
The packet should be ignored when the 
destination IP is recorded into the counter table. 
This mechanism records the number of failed 
connection packets such as ICMP and TCP 
RESET packets that are returned from the external 
destination address to the internal forged. It 
monitored source IP address based in the router. 
Once detecting the first failed connection packets, 
the algorithm then extracts (the source address, 
source port, destination address, destination port) 
from the packet and creates the record. 
In this algorithm, several new equations are 
applied to detect the worm. It is supposed β =100 
and then X= (1 to n) average of failure connection 
in one minute. Threshold can be processed by the 
following equation:- 
Sum. of threshold=2^(6.65+0.050054(β-X)) 
The equation depends on the average of failure 
connection to compute the threshold. IFCA can 
detect the worm early in usual time. But if the 
worm cannot be detected in early stage, the 
algorithm provides more time and new threshold 
to detect the worm. 
T1=(sum. of threshold/average of failure 
connection) 
T2= (time now – time start of the algorithm) 
IFCA is dynamic in detecting the worm 
because it calculates the threshold every time. 
IFCA detects the worm by comparing T1 to T2 as 
follows: If (T2 is small or equal to T1) and (the 
counter is greater than or equal to the summation 
of Threshold) the worm is detected. Check T1, 
T2. If (T2 is greater than T1), then go to feed back 
and decrease the average with new calculate to 
give other chance to detect the worm. If T1 is 
smaller than T2, then forward the traffic because 
it is a normal connection. Whenever the counter 
value does not exceed the threshold during time 
cumulative computation phrase, the traffic sent 
from the corresponding IP address would be 
forwarded as normal activity (See Figure 5). 
When the worm is detected the signature 
generation will run to find the signature of this 
worm. as it explained in the next section. 
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6. Signature generation 
 
In previous section unknown worm is detected 
by its behavior. It is a very useful way, but it still 
has an overload because it still needs to repeat this 
algorithm each time to the same worm. So this 
paper it suggests to have full benefit of this 
algorithm by generating the signature of the worm 
that has been detected. 
 
6.1. Traffic Monitor 
 
The traffic-monitor thread catches all inbound 
and outbound data packets only and stores them in 
a list called suspicions list. From each packet it 
takes the source address, source port, destination 
address, and data and stores them in the 
suspicions list as record fields (Figure 6). 
 
 
Fig. 6 . Suspicions List Record Fields. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7.  Creating the Suspicions List. 
 
After the TCP connection success; data 
packets will be send; these packets may be a 
worm packet. This thread will save all packets in 
a suspicions list till the threshold exceed or time 
over in behavior base threat then the suspicions 
list will be cleared and tried again. If the threshold 
exceeds, it means that there is a worm found by 
behavior base thread. So the suspicions list must 
be copied to signature generation thread and then 
will be cleared. This process is illustrated in 
Figure 7. 
 
6.2. Signature Generation Algorithm 
 
A signature algorithm is a method for signing a 
message stored in electronic form. As such, a 
signed message can be transmitted over a 
computer network. It represents hand-written 
signature on the paper. Its main method is to 
specify the person who is responsible for the 
documents. But digital signature scheme is 
superior to hand  –written signature in that it is 
none-forge but easier identification [20].  
The generated signatures used are in the form 
of Simplified Regular Expression (SRE). It will 
also define a “more specific than” relation on this 
signature model that allows two signatures to be 
compared to determine if one is a more specific 
form of the other [21]. It use this relation to 
analytically define  “the most specific” signature 
for a polymorphic worm, and hence, formalize the 
problem of signature generation for polymorphic 
worms. Based on the concept of the most specific 
signature, it proposed a signature generation 
algorithm using multiple sequence alignment. The 
generated signature is represented in SRE, which 
is effective and precise because of its successful 
one-byte invariant extraction and emphasis on the 
order and distance of extracted invariant parts. 
In this section, it focuses on generating 
accurate signatures for a polymorphic worm. It 
will propose a more precise signature type, the 
SRE signature, and it will briefly introduce a 
signature generation method based on multiple 
signature alignment (MSA). Finally it will 
compare the SRE with other signature types. 
 
6.2.1. SRE Signature Type 
 
Motivated by the insufficiency of current 
signature types for expressing distance restriction, 
the SRE signature type designed from regular 
expression. It is believed that regular expression 
has significant advantages for intrusion detection 
in terms of flexibility, accuracy, and efficiency Rana Dhia'a Abdu-Aljabar        Al-Khwarizmi Engineering Journal, Vol. 8, No.3, PP40 -52 (2012) 
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[22]. Regular expressions have been widely used 
in intrusion detection systems, for example, in 
Snort and Bro. However, the full regular 
expression is too complex and its numerous 
syntax rules are not needed for worm detection. 
Hence, it introduces the simplified regular 
expression as a way of representing worm 
signatures. An SRE signature is a simplified form 
of a regular expression that contains only two 
qualifiers,  “.*” and  “.{k}.” These can each be 
further abbreviated by replacing  “.*” with  “*”, 
which represents an arbitrary string (including a 
zero length string), and by replacing “.{k}” with 
“[k],” which represents a string consisting of k 
arbitrary characters. For example, 
“‘one’[2]‘two’*” is an SRE signature that is 
equivalent to the regular expression 
“one.{2}two.*”. Suppose that Ф={*,[k]} is the set 
of the two qualifiers and  ∑+ is the set of 
nonempty strings over a finite alphabet  ∑. An 
SRE signature is defined as follows: 
Definition 1 (SRE Signature). An SRE 
signature is a signature in the form of (q0)s1q1s2 . . 
. qk-1sk(qk), where qi   Ф is a qualifier, si     ∑+ is 
a substring (i   [0; k]), and(q0) and (qk) mean q0 
and qk are optional. 
The length of an SRE signature define as the total 
number of characters in substrings plus the 
number of qualifiers, and use |X| to denote the 
length of an SRE signature X. For example, given 
an SRE signature X =  “*‘a’[2]‘bbb’[1]‘cccc’*”, 
|X|= 11 (1    2    3    1    4). 
Compared with the previous signature types to 
be used for worm detection, the SRE signature 
type is a more precise signature presentation 
because it can express distance restrictions of 
adjacent invariant parts using qualifiers (e.g., [k] 
shows the distance of k bytes). In addition, SRE 
signatures, in the form of regular expressions, can 
be easily converted into existing intrusion 
detection system (IDS) rules, and vice versa. This 
is illustrated in section 6.2.3. 
 
6.2.2.  SRE Signature Generation  
 
The approach comprises three main steps: 
multiple sequence alignment, noise elimination 
and signature transformation. It first transforms a 
set of samples (network flows) of a polymorphic 
worm into a set of character sequences, and then 
generate an SRE signature for this worm. Figure 8 
illustrates the procedure.  ‘WormSample1’ 
(‘‘ONEwerTWOtyjfTHREEcxbfd’’)                     
to  ‘WormSample6’ 
(‘‘yuiddONEnsddTWOweredsTHREEnfg’’) are 
six worm samples and ‘noise1’ and ‘noise2’ are 
two noise samples. The first step analyzes and 
aligns these worm samples and noise flows. 
The alignment is represented as a colored 
matrix, where the greater the number of identical 
characters in a column, the darker its color. The 
next step is to identify noise samples using a noise 
elimination algorithm. Figure 8 shows sequences 
‘noise1’ and ‘noise2’ correctly identified as noise 
flows. The remaining sequences are recognized as 
worm samples. From them, identical characters in 
the same columns are extracted as invariant bytes 
of the polymorphic worm. Step 3 produces an 
SRE signature  ‘‘*‘ONE’[4]‘TWO’*‘THREE’*’’ 
by putting distance restrictions between adjacent 
invariant bytes. This is the most specific signature 
of the worm. This approach steps will explained 
briefly bellow: 
 
Step 1: Multiple Sequence Alignment (MSA) 
Sequence alignment compares pair or multiple 
sequences by searching for a series of individual 
characters or character patterns that are in the 
same order in the sequences. The definition of 
multiple sequence alignment is given in 
Definition 2. An alignment (result) is represented 
as a matrix A and the row A p within the matrix 
represents the aligned sequence of s p. Gaps (‘–’) 
are inserted between elements so that elements 
with identical characters from different sequences 
can be aligned in the same columns. As can be 
seen in Figure 8, it use colors to indicate how 
many rows containing an identical character for 
each column of A. Columns with more rows are 
filled with a darker color. 
 
Definition 2. (Multiple Sequence Alignment.) 
Given a family of sequences S ={s1; .; sk} over 
an alphabet ∑, |sp| is the length of the sequence sp, 
and an alignment of sequences in S is a (k× N)- 
matrix A = (Ap;i)1≤p≤k;1≤i≤N with max1≤p≤k |sp| ≤ N ≤ 
∑1≤p≤k |sp|, if and only if: 
1. Ap, i  ∑  {‘–’} (where ‘–’  ∑ is called a gap); 
2. Upon removal of all blanks, row A p = (Ap, i) 
1≤i≤N reduces to Sp; and 
3. No column consists only of blanks. 
 
Step 2: Noise Elimination 
Owing to imperfect suspicious flow 
classification or worm sample clustering, there 
may be noise in worm samples. This step finds the 
noise and removes it. As can be seen in Figure 8 
(step 2), sequences (rows in matrix) identified as 
noise do not have ‘*’ at the end of the sequence 
name, but the sequences identified as worm 
samples do. Rana Dhia'a Abdu-Aljabar        Al-Khwarizmi Engineering Journal, Vol. 8, No.3, PP40 -52 (2012) 
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Imperfect suspicious flow classification or 
worm sample clustering can produce noise in 
worm samples which must be eliminated to derive 
accurate worm signatures. Since MSA in step 1 
generates maximum element matches from each 
pair wise alignment, a limited number of noise 
flows will not influence the extraction of most 
common characters. That is, most worm samples 
can be aligned to get valuable matches even if 
there are a few noise flows. There are two noise 
samples at Step 1 in Figure 8, yet the six worm 
samples are properly aligned to show extractable 
common invariant parts.  
The proposed noise elimination algorithm is 
designed to improve the accuracy of signature 
generation in a noise-tolerant way. Given the  
alignment of k sequences, it defines a noise 
tolerance rate   (0≤ ≤1); and selects [k ] 
sequences as noise within k sequences. The 
remaining k – [k ] sequences will be regarded as 
worm samples and it will use them to output the 
final SRE signature. The noise elimination 
algorithm first determines the invariant bytes of a 
polymorphic worm. The invariant bytes will be 
characters that appear more than [k. ] times in 
one column. Then we determine [k. ] noise 
samples as those containing fewer invariant bytes. 
The noise elimination algorithm is shown briefly 
in [23].  
The selection of the noise tolerance rate   is a 
key point in the noise elimination algorithm. A 
fixed value of   could be impractical. If   is too 
small, some noise may not be filtered out. In 
contrast, if   is too large, some worm samples 
may be wrongly eliminated as noise and there will 
be not enough worm samples left. In both cases, 
the approach may fail to generate accurate 
signatures. It use an adaptive   scheme that   
changes its value according to the total number of 
available sequences (k, and k is required to be 
over 4), as shown in Formula (1). The objective of 
this scheme is to ensure that for any k (k > 4), k  
[0.8k – 3.2] sequences will be chosen as noise, k 
- k  = k(1 -  ) 4 +   [20%(k – 4)] sequences will 
be chosen as worm samples. In other words, at 
least 4 sequences will be chosen as samples. For 
the remaining k -4 sequences, it chooses 20% as 
samples (80% as noise), a conservative policy. 
 = 0.8 – 3.2/k (k > 4)                                     ...(1) 
  
 
 
Fig. 8. SRE Signature Generation Steps. 
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Step 3: SRE Signature Transformation from 
Alignment Result 
An alignment result can be easily transformed 
into an SRE signature. Given an alignment of 
multiple worm samples, after the noise 
elimination and invariant byte extraction, it can 
get the distance restriction for adjacent invariant 
bytes by counting the number of in-between none-
blank positions. Taking Figure 8 as an example, 
the corresponding SRE signature is 
‘‘[0,6]‘ONE’[4]‘TWO’[1,6]  ‘THREE’[1,5]’’, 
where  ‘[1,6]’ is a distance bound restriction 
meaning that there are at least one and at most six 
elements between ‘TWO’ and ‘THREE’ in worm 
samples (WormSample1–WormSample6). 
Although using  ‘[k1, k2]’ to express a distance 
bound restriction (instead of ‘*’ in SRE signature) 
is a more precise way to express the range 
distance restriction, this algorithm [23, 24] does 
not adoptsuch a distance bound restriction in 
generated signatures. This is because even though 
there are some range distance restrictions in 
polymorphic worms that can be exactly expressed 
by a bound of ‘[k1, k2]’, it may not be able to 
extract a perfect bound given inadequate worm 
samples. For instance it is supposed that a 
polymorphic worm should have a real range 
distance restriction with the bound of ‘[1, 100]’. If 
the worm samples are inadequate, as a result, it 
may only gets an over-  specific bound, like 
‘[12,50]’, which will result in a high false 
negative rate. The last step in this approach 
outputs SRE signatures by extending each range 
bound of‘[k1, k2]’ to  ‘*’; i.e., extending 
‘‘[0,6]‘ONE’[4]‘TWO’[1,6]‘THREE’[1,5]’’ to 
‘‘*‘ONE’[4]‘TWO’* ‘THREE’*’’, as in Figure 8. 
Note that it still keeps the fixed distance 
restriction in generated SRE signatures (like [4] in 
Figure 8). 
 
 
Fig.  9. One Version of Polymorphic Code Red II Worm. 
 
 
6.2.3. Compared SRE with  Other 
Signature Types. 
 
It is natural to ask what is "a more accurate" 
and what is " the most accurate" signature for a 
polymorphic worm. Intuitively, " the most 
accurate" signature should be "the most specific," 
that is, in a balance of specific and general: 
specific—it contains as many features of the 
worm as possible so that it will not lead to false 
positives; general—it does not contain any useless 
or incorrect features of the worm so that it will not 
lead to false negatives.  
Definition 3 (Containment,  ) Let X and Y be 
two SRE signatures, it says that Y contains X, 
denoted by X   Y, if L(X)  L(Y). That is, the 
strings that match signature X must also match 
signature Y. 
Definition 4 (More specific than,  ). Let X and 
Y be two SRE signatures. If X   Y and |X| > |Y|, 
it says that X is more specific than Y, or Y is 
more general than X, and this is denoted by X 
Y. Here are some examples for Definition 3 and 
Definition 4: 
“‘abc’*‘bcd’”    “‘ab’*‘cd’”,  “‘ab’[2]‘cd’”   
“‘ab’*‘cd’”;  “‘aaa’*‘b’”    “‘aa’*‘b’”, 
“‘aa’[3]‘c’”   “‘aa’*‘c’”. Note that if a network 
flow f (as a special SRE signature with only one 
substring and without qualifiers) matches an SRE 
signature X, it also uses “f   X” to denote it. For 
instance, the flow  “abcdef” matches  “‘ab’*‘ef’” 
can be denoted by “abcdef”   '''ab'*'ef'''. 
Definition 5 (Signature of a polymorphic 
worm, <∙ ). Given a polymorphic worm w, if all 
possible samples of w match an SRE signature X, 
then X is a signature of w, and this is denoted by 
w <∙ X. 
Definition 6 (The most specific signature of a 
polymorphic worm, MSSig).  Given a 
polymorphic worm w and its SRE signature X, if 
w <∙ 
 X and for any other SRE signature X' such 
that both w <∙  X' and X   X' hold, then X is the 
most specific signature (MSSig) of w, and this is 
denoted by X = MSSig(w). Rana Dhia'a Abdu-Aljabar        Al-Khwarizmi Engineering Journal, Vol. 8, No.3, PP40 -52 (2012) 
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From the above definitions, now it can answer 
"what is a more accurate signature" for a 
polymorphic worm and are able to compare the 
accuracy of two signatures. Suppose that both X 
and Y are signatures of a polymorphic worm w (w 
<∙ X and w <∙  Y). Signature X is more accurate 
than Y if and only if X ≺Y. Given a number of 
samples of a polymorphic worm, the signature 
generation problem is formalized by the Problem 
bellow:  
Problem (The most specific signature 
generation for a single polymorphic worm). 
INPUT: s 1 ; . . . ; s n  are n samples of a 
polymorphic worm w. 
OUTPUT: A signature X such that X =MSSig(w). 
Given the polymorphic Code Red II worm in 
Figure 9, it can convert the generated signatures 
by previous NSG methods into the defined SRE 
signature format. Honeycomb [25] outputs 
“*‘.ida?’*”. Polygraph [9] outputs  “‘GET / 
’*‘.ida?’*‘XX’*‘%u’*‘%u780’*‘HTTP/1.0\r\n’”. 
Hamsa[10]outputs 
“‘GET/’*‘.ida?’*‘%u’*‘%u780’ 
*‘HTTP/1.0\r\n’*”. 
If these SRE signatures are denoted by X1;X2, 
and X3, all of them are signatures of the worm 
according to Definition 5. However, none of them 
is the most specific signature according to 
Definition 6 because given an SRE signature Y = 
“‘GET / ’ * ‘ .ida?’*‘XX’*‘%u’[4]‘%u780’*‘= 
’[1]‘HTTP/ 1.0\r\n’”, obviously, Y    X 1, Y    
X2, and Y   X3. That is, Y is more specific than 
X1, X 2 , X 3 . This implies that the signatures 
generated by the previous methods are not  “the 
most accurate”. 
 
7. The Central Alarm Procedure 
 
When the worm has been detected by the 
behavior-base thread it send to central alarm 
procedure the source address (src.add) and source 
port (src.port) that the worm was use it. The 
central alarm procedure will register the address 
that have a worm and send an alarm message to 
all sensors to not accept any data from this src.add 
and src.port till the signature generation generate 
the signature of that worm. 
When the signature generation thread finishes 
the signature, it gives it to center alarm procedure 
to send it to all sensors to update their database 
signature-base even to his signature-base 
database. And it motivates the signature bases to 
immediately scan in the new detecting worm for 
all computers it is responsible  for. 
8. The Result 
 
The IFCA has a good result in detecting the 
worms and it is interested in finding the stealthy 
worms. But because the IFCA needs to repeat 
detecting all worms even it previously found it so 
it cause an overload on its algorithm runtime. 
Suppose that there are N samples, each having 
a length L, the total time complexity of the SRE 
[23] is O (N
2L
2) O (NL
2). This proposal overcome 
the overload in both algorithms by using a hybrid 
solution to minimize the overall runtime; it used 
the IFCA to detect the unknown worms then it 
takes the worms samples that it collecting using 
traffic monitor thread to generate the signature 
that it will be used by signature base. By using 
signature base in detection the same worms if they 
appear again it will overcome the overload in 
IFCA. 
Each of IFCA and the signature generation are 
built as threat to run in parallel, so it overcomes 
the time complexity in SRE algorithm. 
In signature accuracy it is found that from 
section 6.2.3 that the tested Code Red II worm in 
Polygraph algorithm lost  ‘‘=’’ and the distance 
restrictions of invariant parts and in Hamsa 
algorithm lost  ‘‘=’’, the order and the distance 
restrictions of invariant parts in SRE signature, 
that it adopted in this design, is not missed. 
In this design all data (inbound or outbound) 
are under monitoring using traffic-monitor thread 
(section 6.1) and it detects the known and 
unknown worms, so it overcomes the drawback of 
S. Behal el al.[8] design. 
From the above it seen that the proposal design 
offer many features in detecting unknown and 
stealthy worms, the high speed in worm detecting, 
the most signature accuracy and finally the 
improvement in its performance by using a 
distributed collaborative scheme in it defenses 
against the worms attack. 
 
 
9. Conclusion and Scope for Future Work  
 
This paper uses a hybrid solution between the 
two detection algorithms; behavior based 
algorithm; to have it feature in detecting unknown 
worms and signature base algorithm to have its 
speed in detecting. 
In behavior base detection it used IFCA 
algorithm which it faster in detecting the worm 
than other traditional Failure Connection 
algorithms. Also, the algorithm can detect the 
stealthy worms. And it used SRE algorithm in Rana Dhia'a Abdu-Aljabar        Al-Khwarizmi Engineering Journal, Vol. 8, No.3, PP40 -52 (2012) 
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signature generation and it shows how it is the 
most accurate in finding the signature. A new 
method is built for collecting the data in a 
temporary list to have adequate samples for 
signature generation.  
This design used distributed collaborative 
scheme based on the small-world network model 
to improve the system performance comparing to 
single-point defense scheme. 
This paper proposed a design just for detecting 
the network worms. Future research will work on 
studying the protection of the network against 
worms and cascading failures using a link 
isolation strategy based on the quarantining of 
susceptible clusters in the network (modularity 
partitioning). This strategy aims to maximize the 
epidemic control while minimizing the impact on 
the clusters performance.  
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ﺖﯿﻧﺮﺘﻧﻻا ناﺪﯾد ﺪﺿ ﻦﻣآ ﺔﻜﺒﺷ مﺎﻈﻧ ﻢﯿﻤﺼﺗ   
 
رﺎﺒﺠﻟا ﺪﺒﻋ ءﺎﯿﺿ ﺎﻧر   
تﺎﻣﻮﻠﻌﻤﻟا ﺔﺳﺪﻨھ ﺔﯿﻠﻛ  / ﺔﻌﻣﺎﺟ   ﻦﯾﺮﮭﻨﻟا   
    
 
  
ﺔﺻﻼﺨﻟا   
  
ثﻮﺤﺒﻟا دﻮﮭﺟ ﻦﻣ ﺮﯿﺜﻛو ،ﺖﯿﻧﺮﺘﻧﻼﻟ ﻲﺴﯿﺋر ﺪﯾﺪﮭﺗ ﺖﻠﻜﺷ ﺔﻟﺎﻌﻔﻟا ناﺪﯾﺪﻟا   ﺎﮭﯿﻠﻋ ﺰﻛر  .  قﺮﻃ ﻦﻋ ﺮﺸﺘﻨﺗ ﻲﺘﻟا ﺖﯿﻧﺮﺘﻧﻻا ةدوﺪﺑ ﺔﻤﺘﮭﻣ ﺔﻗرﻮﻟا هﺬھ TCP  ،
ﻠﻏأ ﺮﺒﺘﻌﯾ يﺬﻟا  ﺖﯿﻧﺮﺘﻧﻻا ﻰﻠﻋ ﻞﻤﻌﻟا ﺔﻛﺮﺣ ﺔﯿﺒ  .  ﻊﯿﻗﻮﺘﻟا ﻒﺸﻛ دﺎﻤﺘﻋأو كﻮﻠﺴﻟا ﻒﺸﻛ دﺎﻤﺘﻋا ،ﻒﺸﻛ ﻲﺘﯿﻣزراﻮﺧ ﻦﯿﺑ ﻦﯿﺠھ ﻞﺣ مﺪﺨﺘﺴﺗ ﺔﻘﯾﺮﻃ ﺮﮭﻈﺗ ﻲھ
ﺎﻤﮭﻨﻣ ﻞﻛ تاﺰﯿﻤﻣ ﻰﻠﻋ لﻮﺼﺤﻠﻟ  . إ  ﻦﻣ ﺪﯿﺟ ﻞﺣ ﺎﮭﻟ نأ ﺔﺳارﺪﻟا هﺬھ فﺪھ ن ةدوﺪﻟا فﺎﺸﺘﻛا   ةدوﺪﻟاو   ﺔﻋﺮﺴﻟا ةﺰﯿﻤﺑ ﺔﯿﺤﺒﺸﻟا  .  ﻂﻄﺨﻤﺑ ﻢﻤﺻ حاﺮﺘﻗﻻا اﺬھ
ﻣ ﻲﻧوﺎﻌﺗ لﺎﻌﻓ ﻞﻜﺸﺑ مﺎﻈﻨﻟا ءادأ ﻦﯿﺴﺤﺘﻟ ﻲﻤﻟﺎﻌﻟا ﺮﯿﻐﺼﻟا ﺔﻜﺒﺸﻟا جذﻮﻤﻧ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺪﻨﺘﺴﻣ عزﻮ .   
    